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Abstract
I argue that Isaac Newton’s De Gravitatione should not be considered an
authoritative expression of his thought about the metaphysics of space and
its relation to physical inquiry. I establish the following narrative: In De
Gravitatione (circa 1668–1684), Newton claimed he had direct experimental
evidence for the work’s central thesis: that space had “its own manner of
existing” as an aection or emanative eect. In the 1710s, however, through
the prodding of both Roger Cotes and G. W. Leibniz, he came to see that this
evidence relied on assumptions that his own Principia rendered unjustiable.
Consequently, he (i) revised the conclusions he explicitly drew from the
experimental evidence, (ii) rejected the idea that his spatial metaphysics was
grounded in experimental evidence, and (iii) reassessed the epistemic status
of key concepts in his metaphysics and natural philosophy. The narrative I
explore shows not only that De Gravitatione did not constitute the metaphys-
ical backdrop of the Principia as Newton ultimately understood it, but that
it was the Principia itself that ultimately lead to the demise of key elements
of De Gravitatione. I explore the implications of this narrative for Andrew
Janiak’s and Howards Stein’s interpretations of Newton’s metaphysics.
1. i n t r o d u c t i o n
Newton’s commitment to absolute space—the immobile, eternal arena in which
all things exist—is well known. Before 1962, it was studied through three main
*I thank Benjamin Goldberg, Chris Smeenk, the journal’s anonymous referees, as well as
audiences at the Princeton-Bucharest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, &HPS2, and the Ohio
State University for feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
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sources: the scholium to the denitions of the Principia (1687, 1713, 1726; hereafter:
E1, E2, E3), the General Scholium (E2, E3), and the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence
(1717). Other historical evidence was scarce.1 In 1962, A. Rupert Hall and Marie
Boas Hall published a previously unknown Newtonian manuscript they titled
by its incipit De Gravitatione et aequipondio uidorum et solidorum in uidis
(hereafter: DG).2 The work begins as a synthetic treatment of hydrostatics, but
shortly after digresses into an anti-Cartesian polemic that contains Newton’s
most extensive treatment of the metaphysics of space.3 Written in Newton’s
hand, it contains relatively few corrections and additions, suggesting it was a
cleaned-up, considered copy of earlier, messier work. Its dating is unclear. It
was certainly authored between 1668 and 1684, likely in stages, but there is no
scholarly consensus.4 Since 1962, DG has come to tower in importance over the
remainder of Newton’s philosophical writings, even as more of these have come
to light. Its richness of argumentation, attentive engagement with metaphysics
and theology, and explicitly philosophical goals make it a favorite of historians of
philosophy. In fact, scholars often take DG to represent the Newtonian position
on the metaphysics of space, the position he purportedly held to his death in
1727.5
The present essay is the rst of a pair that challenge this interpretive tradition.
I argue in both that historians of philosophy cannot continue to consider the
manuscript an authoritative expression of Newton’s thought, specically about
1The Opticks’s aether queries (1717) were available, but are enigmatic and only indirectly
related to space. Some of Newton’s other writings were published in 1838 (Rigaud, Historical Essay)
and 1893 (Ball, An Essay on Newton’s “Principia” ), but the signicant writings on space were only
published in the past 60 years, most thanks to J. E. McGuire. See McGuire and Rattansi, “Newton
and the ‘Pipes of Pan’”; McGuire, “Newton on Place, Time, and God: An Unpublished Source”;
McGuire, “Body and Void.” The interpretive weight proper to the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence
is a subject of debate; see Vailati, Leibniz and Clarke: A Study of Their Correspondence and Koyré
and Cohen, “Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence.”
2Newton, Unpublished Scientic Papers of Isaac Newton, 89–156. References below are to the
newer english translation in Newton, Philosophical Writings, 12–39. It is often modied, with the
help of Howard Stein’s (http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/newton-de-grav-stein-trans.pdf).
I refer to propositions and corollaries in the Principia as, e.g., E2.2.24.c5, indicating second edition,
Book II, Proposition 24, Corollary 5.
3Newton never called DG his “metaphysics,” but we have come to use the term. See Stein,
“Newton’s Metaphysics.” I thank an anonymous referee for urging me to stress this.
4See Runer, “Newton’s De gravitatione.”
5I know of no one who takes DG to represent the Newtonian position simpliciter. In fact,
the extent to which DG diverges from Newton’s “mature” views about, say, inertia or active
principles is often used as a parameter by which to date the work. Nevertheless, DG’s metaphysics
of space—clearly the heart of the work—is regularly taken to represent his mature views on space.
Cf. n. 7.
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the metaphysics of space and its relation to physical inquiry. There are several
prima facie problems in doing so, but I address just one. DG was authored before
the Principia: before Newton formulated his laws of motion, discovered universal
gravitation, and much before he explored their full, sometimes startling, implica-
tions. Taking it as authoritative thus presumes a conceptual xity across one of
the largest natural-philosophical leaps in early-modernity.6 The presumption is
unjustied.7
My argument is this. In DG (and likely E1), Newton thought he had direct
experimental evidence for his spatial metaphysics. In particular, he had evidence
that space lacked all causal power and so (unlike causally ecacious substances
and their accidents) had “its own manner of existing.” This tight evidentiary
connection between experiment and metaphysics was central to DG. However,
likely in the 1710s, Newton was forced to sever this connection. Through the
prodding of Roger Cotes and G. W. Leibniz, he came to see that his experimental
evidence relied on assumptions which his own rational mechanics rendered
unjustiable.8 To put it simply, the metaphysical theses of DG outstripped the
6Problems I do not address: After DG’s philosophical digression, the manuscript returns
briey to hydrostatics and mysteriously cuts o. Why hydrostatics—and not physical astronomy
or Galilean-style mechanics—provided the appropriate context for this digression has not been
well explained. Second, there is the matter of DG’s unity as a text. The evidence that it was
authored in (incompatible) stages is compelling, but, if so, why were the stages combined as
they were? Third, the text went published. Newton was famously reticent about publication, but
often for good reason (e.g., avoiding theological heterodoxy and public conict). What reason
is appropriate for DG? As many have noted, the views espoused therein were far from unusual
in Newton’s Cambridge. Fourth, neither Newton nor his acquaintances mention the text in
any known manuscript or correspondence. The latter is signicant, for Newton was not averse
to discussing his views with condants. In the 1690s, for example, he shared the extremely
heterodox Classical Scholia with David Gregory, yet (as far as I know) DG was not shared with
anyone. It is possible that DG was a subject of conversation between Newton and Locke, as many
understand Pierre Coste to have suggested, but there is no corroborating evidence (see Locke,
Essai philosophique, xliv).
7This view is also expressed to diering degrees by Ducheyne, The Main Business, 269–283;
Henry, “Gravity and De gravitatione”; and DiSalle, “The Transcendental Method from Newton to
Kant.” Ducheyne argues that Newton’s use of metaphysics/theology to “reach conclusions about
the empirical world” changed over time. I wholly agree and focus on the opposite inferential
direction, on Newton’s changing use of empirical facts to reach conclusions about metaphysics/
theology. Henry convincingly argues for an early dating of DG, and so holds that the work fails to
represent many of Newton’s mature views to a much greater extent than most other scholars. In
particular, he rightly notes that “the discussion of body [in DG] is a unique one-o” (23). DiSalle
explicitly rejects the idea that Newton’s metaphysics of space achieved stable form in DG. I engage
his view directly in Biener, “De Gravitatione Reconsidered: The Changing Role of Geometrical
Denitions in Newton’s Metaphysics of Space.”
8Newton was also challenged by Christiaan Huygens, but about the universality of gravitation
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experimental warrant the Principia’s natural philosophy could provide them.
Because this warrant was central to Newton’s account of space, its failure induced
him to (i) revise the conclusions he explicitly drew from the experimental evidence,
(ii) reject the idea that his spatial metaphysics—specically the idea that space
had “its own manner of existing”—was grounded in experimental evidence, and
(iii) reassess the epistemic status of key concepts in his metaphysics and natural
philosophy. I focus on (i) and (ii) in this essay.9
To establish (i) and (ii), I trace a line of thought from Newton’s ideas about
space and experimental evidence in DG and E1, through his correspondence with
Roger Cotes prior to the publication of E2, to draft denitions of “body” and
“vacuum” intended for Book III of E3. The denitions achieved a polished state
likely in 1716, but were never incorporated into the published work. They were
brought to light by J. E. McGuire almost 50 years ago, but I believe McGuire was not
in a position to appreciate their full signicance.10 McGuire situated them against
Newton’s continuing battles with Leibniz—an undoubtedly important context—
but consequently only emphasized their polemical dimension. They take on a
new meaning when set against Newton’s more sincere interactions with Cotes,
interactions that were intended not to win debate, but to genuinely sort out the
implications of Newton’s dynamical thought in the Principia. I argue that sorting
out these implications ultimately led Newton to reject the idea that his spatial
metaphysics—specically the idea that space had “its own manner of existing”—
was grounded in experimental evidence. This was a marked change from the
position expressed in DG. The view I am developing thus opposes a common
trope in the Newtonian secondary literature: not only did DG not constitute the
metaphysical backdrop of the Principia as Newton ultimately understood it, it
was the Principia itself that ultimately led to Newton’s rejection of key elements
of DG.
and on dierent grounds. See Schliesser and Smith, “Huygens’s 1688 Report” and Smith, “Closing
the Loop: Testing Newtonian Gravity, Then and Now,” 275–277.
9For (iii), see Biener, “De Gravitatione Reconsidered: The Changing Role of Geometrical
Denitions in Newton’s Metaphysics of Space.”
10McGuire, “Body and Void.” McGuire was not in a position to appreciate their full signicance
because maturity had not yet been reached by the line of research that issues from Stein, “Newto-
nian Space-Time”; Cohen, “The Principia, Universal Gravitation, and the ‘Newtonian Style’”; and
Harper and Smith, “Newton’s New Way of Inquiry.” That research has revealed the central role of
the laws of motion in constituting Newton’s framework for the open-ended investigation of force.
I return to this role in §5 and discuss it further in Biener, “De Gravitatione Reconsidered: The
Changing Role of Geometrical Denitions in Newton’s Metaphysics of Space.” See also Brading,
“Newton’s Law-Constitutive Approach to Bodies: A Response to Descartes.”
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Sections 2 and 3 set the scene. In §2, I show that much of Newton’s metaphysics
in DG relied on the claim that space is causally inert. In §3, I review Newton’s
evidence for space’s inertness. I argue that in both DG and E1 Newton took this
evidence to directly establish the failure of Cartesian metaphysics and the success
of the Newtonian alternative. In §4, I elaborate on a challenge brought against
this evidence by Roger Cotes, as well as its broader 1710s context. In §5, I discuss
Newton’s draft denitions to E3, how they alter the signicance of his evidence
for the existence of empty space, and how they address Cotes’s concern. In §6,
I spell out their implications for Newton’s spatial metaphysics and connect my
conclusions to Andrew Janiak’s and Howard Stein’s inuential interpretations of
Newton.
2. e m p t y s p a c e , p ow e r , a n d i n e r t n e s s i n d e g r a v
In DG, Newton’s stated goal was to demonstrate the failure of Descartes’s def-
inition of motion. To this end he oered a variety of conceptual and empirical
arguments that mostly reappeared in the Principia’s scholium on space and time.
From the failure of the denition, he drew the further conclusion that the con-
ceptual framework on which the it relied—primarily the Cartesian identication
of space and body—was itself bankrupt. Newton took Descartes’s abstractionist
argument of Principles, II, §11 as the primary justication for this identication
(more on this later), and declared that “lest any doubt remain about the nature
of motion, I shall reply to this argument by saying what extension and body are,
and how they dier from one another”.11 His alternate account of space followed.
On Newton’s account, six characteristics capture space’s physico-geometry,
modal status, and ontology. Geometrically, space is (1) three-dimensional and
teeming throughout with one-, two-, and three-dimensional forms, (2) actually
innite in all directions, and (3) motionless. Modally and ontically, space is (4)
“an aection of being just as being.” However we read this claim—and scholars
disagree—Newton clearly intended to stress that whatever exists, necessarily exists
spatially; that there is no existence besides spatial existence.12 The necessity of
11DG, 21.
12See McGuire, “Predicates of Pure Existence: Newton on God’s Space and Time”; Carriero,
“Newton on Space and Time: Comments on J. E. McGuire”; Stein, “Newton’s Metaphysics”;
Gorham, “Newton on God’s Relation to Space and Time: The Cartesian Framework”; McGuire
and Slowik, “Newton’s Ontology of Omnipresence and Innite Space”; Schliesser, “Newtonian
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spatial existence grounds space’s fth characteristic. Since everything exists
spatially, and since space is geometrical, everything can be related to space
geometrically. It’s consequently possible—and given the anti-Cartesian arguments
from motion, necessary—to treat motion as motion with respect to space, using
the tools of geometry. In other words, (5) “the positions, distances, and local
motions of bodies are to be referred to the parts of space.” And all the above
claims are forever true because space is (6) “eternal in duration and immutable in
nature.”
Immediately after the fth characteristic—Newton’s alternative to the Carte-
sian denition of motion—but before the sixth, Newton added an unnumbered,
easy-to-overlook feature of space. It is this feature that makes space a truly
physico-geometrical entity, by revealing its position in the causal order:
5. The positions, distances, and local motions of bodies are to be referred to
the parts of space . . . To this it may be further added that there is no force
of any kind present in space that would impede or promote or in any way
change the motions of bodies. And hence projectiles describe straight lines
by uniform motion if they do not meet impediments from a dierent source.
But of this more later.13
In other words, space has no position in the causal order. It is entirely inert. This
may seem like an ohand remark to modern readers, but that’s only because
we’ve come to think of Newtonian space’s lack of causal powers as obvious, even
intuitive. Newton didn’t think so. And he promised to return to the inertness of
space “later” because, in fact, the entirety of DG’s metaphysics depended on it.
In the remainder of this section, I review some familiar aspects of DG in order
to emphasize their deep connection with the inertness of space. I leave Newton’s
arguments for space’s inertness to the next section. In DG, Newton held that
space was ontically distinctive:
[I]t may be expected that I should dene extension as substance, or accident,
or else nothing at all. But by no means, for it has its own manner of existing
which is proper to it and which ts neither substances nor accidents. It is
not substance: rst, [1] because it subsists not absolutely in itself, but, as it
were, as an emanative eect of God and a certain aection of every being;
then, [2] because it is not among the proper aections of the sort that denote
substance, namely actions, such as are thoughts in the mind and motions
in body. [3] For although philosophers do not dene substance as a being
Emanation, Spinozism, Measurement and the Baconian Origins of the Laws of Nature.”
13DG, 26 emphasis added. “Force” is dened in DG as a “causal principle” (36).
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that can act upon something, yet all tacitly understand this of substances, as
for instance is plain from this, [4] that they would easily concede extension
to be a substance like body if only it could be moved and could engage in
the actions of body. And on the other hand, [5] they would by no means
concede that a body is a substance if it could neither be moved nor excite
any sensation or perception in any mind whatever.14 Moreover, [6] since
we can clearly conceive extension existing as it were without any subject,
as when we imagine spaces outside the world or places void of any body
whatsoever, and we believe it to exist wherever we imagine there are no
bodies, and [7] we cannot believe that it would perish with the body if God
were to annihilate some body, it follows that it does not exist in the manner
of an accident inherent in some subject. And thus it is not an accident.15
Newton’s criterion for substantiality is two-fold: substances must subsist in them-
selves (1), and substances must have a power to act (2). The power to act, however,
is clearly dominant: it’s necessary and sucient for substantiality (4, 5) and epis-
temically prior to independent subsistence (5). Moreover, it’s what philosophers
really mean when when they talk about substantiality (3). Subsistence itself is
under-theorized in DG and its status vis-à-vis agency unclear.16 Newton’s criteria
for accident-hood is more complex, but suce it to say that it presumes accidents
must be co-present with the substances that possess them (6, 7), and so, given the
criterion for substantiality, must be co-present with powers to act. Where there
are no powers, there can be no substances and, a fortiori, no accidents.
The inertness of space is central to DG because our knowledge of space’s
status as an aection/emanation rests on it.17 On the one hand, this inertness
rules space out as a substance. On the other, it allows us to conceive of space as
existing where there are no non-divine powers and thus no created substance—it
rules space out as an accident. Since it is neither substance nor accident but
something nonetheless, space must have “its own manner of existing.”
14DG, 21–22.
15DG, 21–22.
16The reason subsistence is under-theorized may be that it is only metaphorically ascribed to
created substance: “[the] notion of bodies having, as it were, a complete, absolute, and independent
reality in themselves . . . all of us, through negligence, are accustomed to have in our mind . . . .
[yet] God does not sustain his creatures any less than they sustain their accidents, so that
created substance, whether you consider its degree of dependence or its degree of reality, is of an
intermediate nature between God and accident” (32).
17There are debates about Newton’s use of “emanation” and “aection,” their meaning, and
the extent to which one or the other is a preferred concept. I remain agnostic about this issue.
Dierent passages in DG recommend subtly dierent readings and choice among them is not
relevant to my thesis. See works in n. 13.
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In the passage above, Newton focused on the causal powers appropriate for
body, but space is clearly lacking all powers. Later in DG, he wrote:
“[E]xtension is eternal, innite, uncreated, uniform throughout, not in the
least mobile, nor capable of inducing change of motion in bodies or change
of thought in the mind . . . ”18
Despite its many anti-Cartesianisms, DG is a remarkably Cartesian text.19 Ac-
cordingly, in it Newton considered only two sorts of (created) substance: body
and mind. But, presumably, if there were other sorts of substance, space would be
incapable of their actions as well. This condition is crucial. Space’s inertness pro-
vides evidence for its distinctive manner of existing, and, as others have argued,
its manner of existing grounds its key characteristics: necessity, immutability,
eternality, innitude, and as we saw earlier, ability to support a new denition
of motion.20 If space were capable of some action, it would not manifestly have
its “own manner of existing” and entirely dierent arguments would be needed
to warrant its other characteristics. Newton’s commitment to inertness is thus
indispensable. It lies at the root of DG’s account of space.
DG’s account of body is similarly predicated on space’s inertness. Newton
famously conceived of bodies as regions of space that God lls with certain powers
through a creative act of His will:
[W]e can dene bodies as determinate quantities of Extension which om-
nipresent God aects with certain conditions: these are (1) that they be mobile
. . . (2) That two of this kind cannot coincide . . . (3) That they are able to
excite various perceptions of the senses and the fancy in created minds . . . 21
Given Newton’s criterion of substantiality, it isn’t surprising that he dened bodies
through their possession of powers.22 This strategy would make no sense, however,
18DG, 33, emphasis added. Note that this list is a compressed version of space’s six characteristics:
“Extension is [6] eternal, [2] innite, [4] uncreated, [1] uniform throughout, [3] not in the least
mobile, [5] nor capable of inducing change of motion in bodies . . . ” In this passage, Newton clearly
took inertness to be the salient feature of space’s fth characteristic, not the necessity of referring
motions to space.
19McGuire, “A Dialogue with Descartes: Newton’s Ontology of True and Immutable Natures”;
Gorham, “Newton on God’s Relation to Space and Time: The Cartesian Framework.”
20On how space’s manner of existing as an aection/emanation grounds its key characteristics,
see works in n. 13. Notably missing from the above list is space’s geometrical character, whose
relationship with the emanation thesis is more complex. See Domski, “Newton’s Mathematics
and Empiricism.”
21DG, 28–29; original emphasis.
22See Stein, “Newton’s Metaphysics,” for a discussion of Newton’s concept of “natural power.”
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if space were not inert, as the possession of powers would not dierentiate bodies
from space. Moreover, bodies would not be quantities of extension that God
willfully aects with all their powers. They would only be quantities that God
partially aects by his will, with a subset of their powers due to their grounding
in space. But Newton certainly supposed that all bodily powers are willed by God.
That supposition would be plainly false if space were capable of action, unless
other of its characteristics—rst and foremost, its uncreatedness—were rejected
as well.
Several more subtle features of DG’s metaphysics also depend on spatial
inertness. Take, for example, the purported explanatory advantages of DG. New-
ton believed that DG’s metaphysics captured whatever insight was contained
in scholastic metaphysics, but more perspicaciously, by substituting clear and
distinct ideas for confused Aristotelian notions. In the case of matter and form:
[Space] takes the place of the substantial subject in which the form of the
body is conserved by divine will; and that eect of the divine will is the form
or formal reason of the body . . . . [Consequently][b]etween extension and
its impressed form there is almost the same analogy that the Aristotelians
posit between prime matter and substantial forms . . . .23
This analogy would be improper if space were not inert. In that case, the relation
of space to body would not echo the relation Aristotelians posit between the
inherently passive substantial subject and the active form, and so Newtonian
metaphysics would not be a deeper explanation of, and replacement to, scholastic
metaphysics.
For another example, the purported theological advantage of Newtonian
metaphysics over both Cartesian and Aristotelian views would be lost if space
were causally ecacious. For Newton, our will and God’s will are of the same
kind, if of vastly dierent scopes. Consequently, we can understand God’s act
of willing powers into space—thus creating bodies—by reference to our own
acts of willing our bodies into motion: “God may appear (to our innermost
consciousness) to have created the world solely by the act of will, just as we move
our bodies by an act of will[.]”24 Since our direct acquaintance with the act of
23DG, 29.
24DG, 30. Newton literally took God’s will and human will to be of the same kind, although he
often insisted that discourse about God is merely gurative. In the General Scholium, for example,
he wrote: “All the diversity of created things, each in its place and time, could only have arisen
from the ideas and the will of a necessarily existing being. But God is said allegorically to see, hear,
speak, laugh, love, hate, desire, give, receive, rejoice, be angry, ght, build, form, construct. For all
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willing makes God’s creative act intimately comprehensible, it also appears to
our innermost consciousness that the world could not have existed without God’s
say-so. Newtonian metaphysics thus blocks a path to atheism which, according
to Newton, Cartesian and Aristotelian alternatives are unable to block. Yet if
space were capable of action, this advantage would be lost. Space’s power would
either have to be due to a separate act of God’s will or be independent of God’s
will. The rst, by making some feature of space an act of God, destroys space’s
status as an aection/emanative eect. It thus raises the possibility that space
could have been dierent than it is, and disturbs the grounds for its necessity,
immutability, and eternality. The second option is prima facie theologically odious
and, moreover, postulates a power whose coming into being is not comprehensible
by analogy with our will, one whose existence does not appear to our innermost
consciousness to depend on God. A causally ecacious space thus destroys the
theological advantage of Newton’s view.
No wonder Newton felt obliged to oer “more” on space’s inertness “later.” Its
inertness is deeply woven into the fabric of DG’s metaphysics.25
3. e v i d e n c e f o r i n e r t n e s s
So what’s the “more”? What was Newton’s evidence for the inertness of space?
Immediately after the account of space and body, Newton returned to “respond
discourse about God is derived through a certain similitude from things human, which while not
perfect is nevertheless a similitude of some kind” (Principia, 942, the last sentence was added in
E3; see also drafts letters to Des Maizeaux, Koyré and Cohen, “Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke
Correspondence”). The quote from DG is repeated almost verbatim in a query added to the Optice
in 1706, with no caveat regarding gurative use (Newton, Opticks, 403).
25There is one loose end to tie up before moving on. Some may think that the counterfactual
I’ve been considering—that space is coupled to some power—is patently absurd. If this were the
case, Newton’s position would be a default that requires no positive argument. But this was/is
not the case. A causally ecacious space was a live option in Newton’s time (as it is in ours!)
and Newton’s rejection of it was a deliberate choice, not a thoughtless fallback. To begin with, I
need only point to Cartesian views that equate space with body, and so imbue it with the same
causal ecacy as body. Although the ultimate seat of corporeal power is unclear in Descartes
(body itself, God, both?), it is clear that Cartesian space is not prima facie inert, for the trivial
reason that space is body. More generally, in the longer history of the concept of space, the idea
that empty space could be causally ecacious or indirectly structure causal relations—although a
minority view—was a repeated motif; see Grant, Much Ado About Nothing, 10, 34. It was certainly
not unusual to inquire, as a contemporary of Newton’s did: “what Exertion of Power or Action
is there in an innite Vacuum?”, even if only to answer negatively (Greene, The Principles of the
Philosophy of the Expansive and Contractive Forces, 17).
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more concisely” to Descartes’s abstractionist argument. In Principles of Philosophy,
II, §11, Descartes argued that if we attend to the idea of some body and strip from
it every feature that does not pertain to its essence, we are left with the idea of
bare extension. Since extension is also the essence of space, it follows that body is
identical with space.26 Newton responded with two sets of arguments, each about
a power he took to be denitional of body: the power to arouse perceptions and
the power to move and resist motion.27 His strategy was to establish that bodies
possess these powers, while space does not.28
First, Newton argued that removing from bodies the power to “move” percep-
tions
runs counter to broader Cartesian doctrine. He did so by brilliantly mobilizing
another touchstone of Cartesianism, the mind/body distinction:
Let us remove from body (as [Descartes] demands) weight, hardness, and
all sensible qualities, so that nothing remains except what pertains to its
essence. Will extension alone then remain? By no means. For we may also
reject that faculty or power by which they move the perceptions of thinking
things. For since there is so great a distinction between the ideas of thought
and of extension that it is not obvious that there is any basis of connection
or relation [between them], except that which is caused by divine power,
that faculty of bodies can be rejected while preserving extension, but not
while preserving corporeal nature.29
Newton accepted the basic structure of Descartes’s argument. We can discover
what’s essential to corporeal substance by taking the idea of body available in
common experience and removing from it all qualities “which bodies can be
deprived of, and made to lack, by the force of nature.”30 The power to arouse
perceptions, however, fails to satisfy this condition. No natural process can remove
26CSM II, 227.
27In the ‘determined quantities of extension’ passage quoted previously, Newton separated
the power to move from the power to resist, yet in the span of DG we are now considering he
regarded motion and resistance as a single power; DG, 28–29 vs. 34–35. The dierence suggests
later authorship.
28One might wonder about the presence of non-corporeal or broadly non-physical powers in
space, as Kochiras, “Gravity and Newton’s Substance Counting Problem,” does. But Newton clearly
assumed that created mental powers were not ubiquitous, so there was no need to demonstrate
that they could be absent under certain conditions.
29DG, 33–34.
30DG, 34. Newton also claimed that we cannot know “the essential and metaphysical constitu-
tion” of bodies (30). In accepting the structure of Descartes’s argument, he seems to have accepted
only that we know what features of body are essential to our idea of it, not its true essential
constitution.
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this power because the chasm between res extensa and res cogitans guarantees
that only a radical change in the divinely instituted frame of nature can alter
the way one may aect the other. By Descartes’s own lights, since extended
things are really distinct from thinking things, no natural change—no change that
can be accounted for in terms of extension and its modes—can alter extension’s
relation to mind. And since the argument from abstraction demands that we strip
from body only those features that can be removed by the force of nature, the
abstractive process cannot reduce body to extension. The mind/body distinction
thus entails the space/body distinction!31
Second, Newton argued for the space/body distinction using tersely formu-
lated experimental evidence, presented in what in what J. A. Ruer dubbed a
“resistance scholium.”32 The scholium was later incorporated into several of the De
motu drafts, the Principia, and even the Classical Scholia. Its durability suggests
that Newton understood his empirical case against Descartes to extend beyond
the analysis of motion and (in the Principia) beyond the failure of vortex theories.
Newton thought he could directly demonstrate the existence of void space. By
‘directly,’ I wish to highlight the dierence between this demonstration and the
arguments from motion that form the core of the scholium on space and time.
Since Howard Stein’s “Newtonian Space-Time,” those arguments have been asso-
ciated with a more sophisticated, perhaps transcendental, form of reasoning; one
according to which the Newtonian concept of space is arrived at by asking what
“make[s] possible an adequate expression of the principles of dynamics” as they
are embodied in mechanical practice or explicated in the Principia.33 Newton’s
demonstration in the resistance scholium is dierent; it draws conclusions from
31DG, 34. I must elide some subtleties in Newton’s argument. For example, note that Newton
distinguished sensible qualities from the power that underlies their sensibility and held that
this power is agentive, not a passive capacity to be perceived. This allowed him to separate
sensible qualities—understood as the congurations of matter and motion correlated with certain
perceptions—from the power, largely unexercised, that enables those congurations to give rise
to occurrent experience. He also explicitly rejected the idea that bodies only have that power
temporarily, when united with minds. Even more interestingly, he left somewhat unspecied
the relation between the power to arouse perceptions and the power to move and resist motion,
alternately suggesting that they are individually sucient or jointly sucient for body, and that
they are independent powers or necessarily connected.
32Runer, “Newton’s De gravitatione,” 242; Smith, “How Did Newton Discover Universal
Gravity?” 43.
33Stein, “Newtonian Space-Time,” 273. See also DiSalle, Understanding Space-Time, Huggett,
“What did Newton mean by ’Absolute Motion’?” For the relation of this form of argument to the
E3 denitions discussed in §5, see Biener, “De Gravitatione Reconsidered: The Changing Role of
Geometrical Denitions in Newton’s Metaphysics of Space.”
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empirical evidence in a way that does not involve judgments about the valid-
ity and necessity of the interpretive framework that makes the phenomena of
mechanics tractable to begin with.
The demonstration concerned the power of bodies to move and resist the mo-
tion of other bodies. It began with an experimental criterion for the incorporeality
of spatial regions:
[I]f we set aside altogether every force of resistance to the passage of bodies,
we must also set aside the corporeal nature utterly and completely . . . . [In
other words,] if there were any aerial or aetherial space of such a kind that
it yielded without any resistance to the motions of comets or any other
projectiles, I should believe that it was utterly empty [inane].34
The evidence followed shortly thereafter, and with it a telling application of the
criterion, one that proved to be of decades-long concern for Newton. The evidence
reads:
[I]t should be observed from what was said earlier that there are empty
spaces [inania] in nature. For if the aether were a corporeal uid entirely
without vacuous pores, however subtle its parts are made by division, it
would be as dense as any other uid, and it would yield to the motion of
passing bodies with no less inertia . . . [But since] the resistance of the
aether is on the contrary so small when compared with the resistance of
quicksilver as to be over ten or a hundred thousand times less, there is all
the more reason for thinking that by far the largest part of the aetherial
space is empty, scattered between the aetherial particles.35
The source of Newton’s numerical estimate for the resistance of the aether—“ten
or a hundred thousand times less . . . ”—is unclear.36 What is clear is that the
aether is not “without any resistance,” but only a resistance much lower than
mercury’s. This is noteworthy. The incorporeality criterion concerned regions
of nil resistance. Regions of low resistance are categorically dierent: they do
not allows us to “set aside altogether every force of resistance,” and thus do not
34DG, 34. Newton’s concern in DG was alternately space (spatium), empty space (inanis
spatium or even inania), and vacuum (vacuum). ‘Space’ was usually reserved for the general
concept synonymous with ‘extension.’ As far as I can tell, ‘empty space’ and ‘vacuum’ were used
interchangeably. In the remainder of this essay, I also use the terms interchangeably, in order
to maintain the overlap in meaning implicit in DG. Part of my overall thesis is that the terms
eventually come apart for Newton, but this will take some time to establish.
35DG, 35. Newton clearly refers Descartes’s ‘subtle’ matter, the constitutive element of the
aether.
36Runer, “Newton’s De gravitatione,” 252.
January 24, 2016 | 13 of 34
zvi.biener@uc.edu
demonstrate that “in space there is no force of any kind that might impede, assist,
or in any way change the motions of bodies.”37 On the face of it, it seems real-
world measurements simply do not pertain to the distinction between empty
space and body. How, then, did Newton conclude that “by far the largest part of
the aetherial space is empty”? Getting clear on this allow us to better appreciate
the exchange between Newton and Cotes examined in §4.
There are two assumptions at work in the previous quote. First, Newton held
that the quantity of matter in a completely full space is proportional only to the
size of the space; i.e., that ‘quantity of matter’ is a volumetric, extensive quantity.
It cannot increase or decrease without a proportional increase or decrease in the
volume fully occupied by matter. I’ll refer to this idea as Newton’s ‘geometrical
conception of matter’. Trivially, it entails that completely full spaces—e.g., the
spaces occupied by atoms—are equally dense.38 Second, Newton assumed that
resistance to motion in a given space is proportional to that space’s density. He
understood resistance as arising from the inertia of minute bodies as they oppose
giving way to an object bumping into them. Trivially, spaces oer no resistance
i they are empty.39
The two assumptions account for Newton’s conclusion. They entail that
spaces of all but maximal resistance must be partially empty and so partially
non-resistive. This is because there is no way to decrease the resistance of a
given space without decreasing the quantity of matter in it, and there is no way
to decrease the quantity of matter without decreasing the overall volume of full
space. Consequently, two identically-sized volumes can only resist dierently if
they are made up of dierent ratios of empty to full parts. The higher the ratio
37DG, 34, 26.
38For Newton’s conceptions of matter, see Biener and Smeenk, “Cotes’ Queries: Newton’s
Empiricism and Conceptions of Matter.” Newton dened the ‘extension’ of a power as “the
quantity of space or time in which it operates” DG, 36.
39Determining the nature of resistance was one of the major and ultimately frustrated goals
of the Principia. There, Newton considered the additional contribution to uid resistance of the
“tenacity and friction of the parts [of the medium,]” only to dismiss it (Principia, 761). Of course,
resistance only arises through relative motion of a projectile and a medium and so features of
the projectile—e.g., speed, square of the speed, shape, and internal constitution—also gure in
determining resistance. What’s important for us is that the contribution of the medium depends
only on its density. A fuller discussion of this crucial assumption is beyond our scope, but suce
it to say that Newton expended much eort trying to gure out how to quantify resistance and
on what features of a medium it depends. What I’m considering here is a most simple account,
but one that highlights a commitment Newton never rejected, i.e., that resistance is proportional
to the density of a medium and arises from the inertia of its parts. For a fuller discussion, see
Smith, “The Newtonian Style in Book II of the Principia,” 252. and Smith, “Was Wrong Newton
Bad Newton?”.
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of empty to full, the lower the resistance; and very low resistance suggests a
preponderance of empty space. Measurements of low resistance thus provide
evidence for the existence of regions of nil resistance. And regions of nil resistance
are, by denition, incorporeal.
What’s most fascinating about this argument is that Newton seems completely
unaware of begging the question! Newton only concluded that there are spaces
“without any resistance” from measurements of low resistance by stipulating that
those regions must be partly empty to begin with. In fact, detailed empirical
information is entirely superuous. The two assumptions entail that if there
is any motion in the universe at all—i.e., if there is any resistance that can be
overcome—empty spaces must exists.
The reasoning is even clearer in Newton’s use of evidence from rise and
descent:
[The existence of non-resistive, empty spaces] may also be conjectured from
the various gravities of these uids [i.e., quicksilver, air, aether], for the
descent of heavy bodies and the oscillations of pendulums show that these
are in proportion to their densities, or as the quantities of matter contained
in equal spaces.40
How do “the various [specic] gravities of uids” show that empty space exists?
On the assumption that quantity of matter is measured by the volume of com-
pletely full space, and so, in a given space, dierences in density can only arise
from dierences in ratios of completely full to completely empty parts.
As far as I know, Newton didn’t repeat the argument from abstraction in any
context outside DG. The argument seems to have died with the work. However,
he did repeat DG’s empirical arguments in the rst edition of the Principia, after
his theory of resistance became considerably more sophisticated. In Book III,
Proposition 6, Corollary 3 (E1.3.6.c3), he wrote:
And thus a vacuum [vacuum] is necessary. For if all spaces were full, the
specic gravity of the uid with which the region of the air would be lled,
because of the extreme density of its matter, would not be less than the
specic gravity of quicksilver or of gold or of any other body with the
greatest density, and therefore neither gold nor any body could descend
in air. For bodies do not ever descend in uids unless they have a greater
specic gravity.41
40DG, 35.
41Principia, 810. For a more thorough discussion of this proposition, its use of pendulum
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By the time Newton authored this proposition, he had signicantly better evidence
that aetherial resistance near the surface of the earth was virtually nil.42 Even
more importantly, he had proved that Kepler’s area law holds exactly for a body
in motion i the only force acting on it is centripetal.43 Although Kepler’s law
does not hold exactly, Newton also showed that departures from Keplerian orbits
are due to mutual perturbations and are distinct from departures due to resistance.
He had every reason to believe that celestial spaces oered only vanishingly small
resistance.
But the increased precision is besides the point. The structure of the argument
remained the same. As in DG, Newton used the phenomena of rise and descent
to show that vacua exist, but only given non-negligible assumptions about the
extensive nature of matter and the nature of resistance. The parallel to DG high-
lights the point raised above: Newton’s anti-Cartesian case in E1 extended beyond
showing that Cartesian vortices cannot account for planetary motion and beyond
the arguments from the nature of motion whose sophisticated methodology was
made famous by Stein. In E1, Newton oered direct empirical evidence against
Cartesian metaphysics, but left it to the reader to connect the dots. When we
connect them, E1.3.6.c3—as much as the scholium on space and time and DG
itself—becomes a window onto Newtonian metaphysics.
Newton even considered making the connection between E1.3.6 and DG’s
metaphysics explicit. In aborted 1690s revisions to the Principia, he considered
adding the following corollaries. His metaphysical train of reasoning is clear:
Corol. 6. Vacuum is granted. . . .
Corol. 8. Atoms are granted.
Corol. 9. An innite and omnipresent spirit in which matter is moved
according to mathematical laws is granted.44
Newton also explicitly indicated that this proposition and its corollaries pertained
to his anti-Cartesian arguments. In the same set of draft corollaries, he wrote:
experiments, and its role in the argument for universal gravitation, see Biener and Smeenk, “Cotes’
Queries: Newton’s Empiricism and Conceptions of Matter” and Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientic
Method, Ch. 7.
42Runer, “Newton’s De gravitatione,” 252–254.
43I thank an anonymous referee for catching an error in my statement of this biconditional.
44Add. 3695, 266v. In the 1690s revisions, Proposition 6 also included material on Fatio de
Duilier’s mechanical aether hypothesis, which also implied that a vacuum is necessary and that
the primary constituents of matters are homogenous. See Newton, Unpublished Scientic Papers
of Isaac Newton, 312–318.
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I am not at all disturbed by that vulgar sophism by which inferences op-
posed to the concept of the vacuum are drawn from the nature of bodies
as extension; since bodies are not so much extension as extended, and they
are utterly distinguished from extension by their solidity, mobility, force of
resistance, and hardness.45
Clearly, he thought E1.3.6 established, and was thus the relevant context for dis-
cussing, the metaphysical theses of DG.
To close this section, let me reemphasize the main claim developed in §2 and §3:
in DG, Newton’s empirical case against the Cartesian identication of space and
body lay at the root of his metaphysics of space, since it established the absolute
absence of corporeal powers from space. The case is repeated, albeit in telegraphic
form, in E1.3.6.c3. Once the centrality of that corollary to Newtonian metaphysics
is recognized, we can see—as we will in §5—that Newton’s reevaluation (in the
1710s) of the evidence provided there signals his broader reevaluation of the
epistemic status of his metaphysics of space.46
Before continuing, I should mention that I have purposely left out the theolog-
ical motivations for Newton’s account of space and his claim that it is necessarily
true. I bracket theology here because while it is clear that the content of Newton’s
conception of space drew signicantly from scriptural sources, he did not oer
scriptural evidence for its truth in either DG or E1. In those two texts—unlike the
General Scholium, “Tempus et Locus,” or the Classical Scholia—Newton limited
himself to conceptual or natural philosophical arguments. My aim here is to
explore to what extent his metaphysics relied on those arguments.47 I turn now
to Newton’s struggles with the evidence just reviewed.
4. e v i d e n c e c h a l l e n g e d
In 1709, Newton began preparing E2 with the editorial help of the recently ap-
pointed rst Plumian chair of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy, Roger
Cotes. I focus here on only one of Cotes’s numerous contributions to the new
45UCL Add 4005 5. F28–29. Newton, Unpublished Scientic Papers of Isaac Newton, 313, 316.
46This narrative thus belies the oft-repeated notion that Newtonian space is somehow ‘be-
yond’ empirical investigation because it is insensible. At least in DG and E1, Newton thought
experimental evidence could nevertheless directly pertain to this insensible entity.
47I address how the purported necessity of Newton’s account bears on my narrative in Biener,
“De Gravitatione Reconsidered: The Changing Role of Geometrical Denitions in Newton’s
Metaphysics of Space.”
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edition, his objection to the corollary just examined.48 First, I show that this
objection caused Newton to reconsider the empirical evidence for empty space
provided in DG and E1. Second, I draw out the implications of Cotes’s objection to
DG’s account of space. The exchange provides us with an important context for
understanding Newton’s late 1710s proposed denitions of “body” and “vacuum,”
which I’ll examine in the subsequent sections.
Cotes’s objection to E1.3.6.c3 relied on the idea that a body’s quantity of
matter—its mass—is measured throughout the Principia by its inertia; that is, by
its response to impressed force. Although “quantity of matter” is also dened as
“a measure of matter that arises from [a body’s] density and volume jointly,” the
denition notes that this quantity “is known from a body’s weight;” that is, from
its response to gravity.49 This procedure should come as no surprise: the laws of
motion only relate mass to change of motion caused by force, not to any other
characteristic of either body or motion. The Principia’s method of quantifying
mass is also consonant with what Howard Stein has called Newton’s metaphysics
of natural power: vis inertia is the essential power of body, “the power of resisting
by which every body, in so far as it is able, perseveres in its state of either resting
or of moving uniformly straight forward.”50 Strictly speaking, in the Principia
mass measures the magnitude of a body’s power.51
Cotes’s objection was that E1.3.6.c3 assumed more than this about mass, thus
importing unjustied content into the Principia. In 1712, he wrote to Newton:
I will take notice of an Objection . . . against the 3d Corollary Prop: VI. Libr
III. [Itaqua Vacuum necessario datur.] Let us suppose two globes A & B of
equal magnitudes to be perfectly ll’d with matter without any interstices
of void Space; I would ask the question whether it be impossible that God
should give dierent vires inertia to these Globes. I think it cannot be said
that they must necessarily have the same or an equal Vis Inertia. Now You do
48The objection is considered in more detail in Biener and Smeenk, “Cotes’ Queries: Newton’s
Empiricism and Conceptions of Matter.” It should be noted that Cotes only eectively edited
half of E2. The rst half of the work, up to proposition 2.10, was delivered to him as a single
installment. Although there are no surviving exchanges about this rst half, Cotes challenged
almost every page of the remainder. I thank an anonymous referee for this point.
49Principia, Denition 1, emphasis added.
50Principia, 404, Denition 3; Stein, “‘From the Phenomena of Motions to the Forces of Nature’:
Hypothesis or Deduction?”
51Newton also called inertia a “passive principle” and contrasted it with “power,” but only after
becoming increasingly interested in “active principles.” He never revised the Principia’s denition
to reect this. The distinction is surely another sign that DG’s metaphysical framework—which
included no such distinction—was becoming less and less relevant in the 1700s. See Add. 3970
619r; Newton Project, NATP00055; Query 31 of Opticks.
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all along in Your Philosophy, & I think very rightly, estimate the quantity of
matter by the Vis Inertia . . . Tis possible then, that ye equal spaces possess’d
by ye Globes A & B may be both perfectly ll’d with matter, so no void
interstices remain, & yet that the quantity of matter in each space shall not
be the same. Therefore when You dene or assume the quantity of Matter
to be proportionable to its Vis Inertia, You must not at the same time dene
or assume it to be proportionable to ye space which it may perfectly ll
without any void interstices; unless you hold it impossible for the 2 Globes
A & B to have dierent Vires Inertia. Now in the 3rd Corollary I think You
do in eect assume both these things at once.52
Cotes’s objection should already be familiar. He pointed out that E1.3.6.c3 con-
cludes that a vacuum exists only because it assumes that the proportion of a
body’s power to the volume it “perfectly ll[s] without any void interstices” is the
same for all bodies; or, what comes to the same thing, that all the fundamental
constituents of matter have the same density. This doesn’t follow from the Prin-
cipia’s laws or denitions—a point Cotes rst put in voluntarist language. Later
in the correspondence, he put the point in terms of evidential relations:
[The corrolary] is true upon this concession, that the Primigenial particles
. . . have all the same Vis Inertiae in respect to their magnitude or extension
in Spatio pleno. I call this a concession because I cannot see how it may be
certainly proved either a Priori by bare abstracted reasoning; or be inferr’d
from Experiments.53
While the Principia is compatible with a xed proportion of mass to extension, it is
equally compatible with a proportion that varies, perhaps even radically. Cotes’s
point was that there are no theoretical considerations internal to the framework
of the Principia that can decide the matter. Moreover, there are no empirical
considerations, for the proportionality concerns objects beyond experimental
reach: either gross bodies that are impossibly compressed or imperceptibly small
atoms.54
Newton was slow to see Cotes’s point and then reticent to accept his conclu-
sions. His commitment to the homogeneity of matter and the essential, deter-
minate proportion between extension and inertia was not quickly overcome.55
52Correspondence, V 228.
53Correspondence, V 242.
54“Impossibly” should be taken literally. The compression would have to remove the void
spaces that remain between atoms after close packing.
55Newton’s reticence is remarkable, since years earlier he had speculated that God may have
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Nevertheless, he ultimately conceded. In E2 (unchanged in E3), a revised corollary
3 repeated the evidence from rise and descent, and a new corollary 4 read:
If all the solid particles of all bodies have the same density and cannot be
rareed without pores, there must be a vacuum. I say particles have the
same density when their respective forces of inertia are as their sizes.56
The conditional is important. It amounts to Newton’s admission that the an-
tecedent is unjustied. And so, only if the proportion of mass to extension is
xed—and we have no reason to believe that it is—a vacuum is granted. The
available empirical evidence simply does not guarantee the existence of vacuum.
The conditional has important consequences. First, it confutes E1.3.6.c3’s
argument for the existence of empty space, and so jeopardizes DG’s and E1’s
case against the Cartesian identication of space and body. Given that Newton
had once thought he could experimentally establish the failure of Cartesian
metaphysics in this very proposition, the conditional phrasing amounts to the
admission that he could only do so given an unjustied assumption; that is, that he
couldn’t do so at all. Second, by confuting the argument for the existence of empty
space, the conditional also threatens DG’s positive theses about the nature of
space, particularly the aection/emanation thesis. Recall, Newton had argued in
DG that space’s status as an aection/emanation followed from space’s inertness,
and that our evidence for this inertness was the very low resistance of aerial and
celestial spaces. That very low resistance implied that certain regions of space
were entirely devoid of resistance, and so proved that “every force can be removed
from space.”57 The inference from low resistance, however, depended on the idea
that the fundamental constituents of matter are homogenously dense—precisely
the assumption Cotes took to task. Without the homogeneity assumption, the
evidence is inconclusive, and so the case for space’s unique “manner of existing”
falters. Once again, given that Newton had thought of establishing his positive
metaphysics of space in this very proposition, it is unlikely the point was lost on
him.
created “Particles of Matter of several Sizes and Figures, and in several Proportions to Space, and
perhaps of dierent Densities” (Query 23 of the 1706 Optice). In fact, he only conceded once Cotes
gently alluded to this passage. His reticence suggests that, at least in 1712, he was still committed
to two subtly incompatible conceptions of matter: matter as a thing that lls space and matter as
a thing that moves and resists. See Biener and Smeenk, “Cotes’ Queries: Newton’s Empiricism
and Conceptions of Matter.”
56Principia, 810.
57DG, 35.
January 24, 2016 | 20 of 34
zvi.biener@uc.edu
The basic premise of Cotes’s critique—that in the Principia mass only measures
the magnitude of a body’s power—also had a deeper implication. Cotes seems
to have been aware of it immediately, but there is no evidence that Newton
recognized it before 1716, when he authored the draft denitions studied in §5. In
correspondence with Samuel Clarke a few months after the above exchange, Cotes
revealed that his problem with the idea that “the Primigenial particles” all have
the same proportion of vis inertia to “extension in Spatio pleno” was not merely
there was no compelling evidence that this proportion was the same, but that
there was no compelling evidence that vis inertia had any necessary connection to
extension. The occasion was a revision of Cotes’s preface to E2 and the essential
properties of matter were the topic of discussion:
I understand by Essential propertys such propertys without which no others
belonging to the same substance can exist: and I would not undertake to
prove that it were impossible for any of the other Properties of Bodies to
exist without even Extension.58
Cotes was willing to entertain unextended bodies, bodies whose vis inertia is not
accompanied by extension. Of course, he was also willing to entertain bodies
whose mass-to-extension ratio varies. His point was simply that he “would not
undertake to prove” either.59 Cotes saw that the only property necessary for
the Principia’s treatment of bodies was their vis inertia. Concerning powers
and properties other than inertia, we must either provide additional evidence or
remain mum.60 Yet he did not present this point in its full generality to Newton.
His exchange with Newton focused exclusively on the determinate proportionality
of extension to inertia and did not broach at all how “other Properties of Bodies”
were related to vis inertia.
Nevertheless, as we shall see in the next section, Newton recognized precisely
this implication, at least by 1716. It forced him to reconsider his idea of empty
space in a radical way. The case requires a bit of context.
58Correspondence, V 412–413.
59Cotes knew quite well that the Principia did prove a variety of facts about extension and body.
Newton went to great lengths to show that both inertia and gravity are extensionally well-behaved:
the inertia of an extended whole equals the inertia of its parts, and the gravitational force of
a whole equals the gravitational force of its parts. Nevertheless, these mereological relations
do not entail that the fundamental constituents of matter are extended. They are compatible
with point-sized particles distributed in space. See Belkind, “Newton’s Conceptual Argument for
Absolute Space”; Principia, Propositions 1.69–1.71.
60Cotes thought that there was sucient evidence to show that gravity was necessarily con-
joined to inertia, and so suggested in a rejected draft of his preface to E2 that gravity was essential.
The above quote is from his response to Clarke’s objection to the essentiality claim.
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5. b o d y a n d e m p t y s p a c e r e v i s i t e d
After 1712, Newton increasingly labored to distinguish his “experimental philoso-
phy” from the more metaphysically speculative philosophy of the Cartesians and
Leibnizians. The attacks, particularly from Leibniz, had become numerous and
weighty. Leibniz’s exchange with Hartsoeker (1711), as well as his simultaneous
engagements with Newton through the mediation of Abbé Conti (1715/16) and
Samuel Clarke through the mediation of Princess Caroline (1715/16), drove similar
points home: Newton had not established the existence of universal gravitation; he
had made non-negligible metaphysical claims which, in his metaphysical naiveté,
he refused to acknowledge; and thus his claims that there were no plausible
vortical theories of gravity—like the one Leibniz oered in Tentamen de motuum
coelestium causis (1689)—were erroneous.61 Flames were only further fanned by
the continued calculus dispute. Leibniz’s death in 1716 did not lay matters to
rest: the Leibniz-Clarke and Conti exchanges were multiply reprinted in the next
years, and Leibniz, of course, was not without supporters. Leibniz’s overarching
charge was that Newtonian theses were plainly conjectural. In November 1715,
for example, he wrote in a letter full of similar charges:
I am strongly in favor of the experimental philosophy but M. Newton is
departing very far from it when he claims that all matter is heavy (or that
every part of matter attracts every other part) which is certainly not proved
by experiments . . . and M. Newton adduces no experiment or sucient
reason for the existence of a vacuum or for atoms or for the general mutual
attraction.62
Multiple, extended drafts of Newton’s seething response survive, although the
nal version to Conti is rather brief. They uniformly take issue with Leibniz’s
61The exchange with Hartsoeker was published in English in the May 1712 issue of Memoirs of
Literature, and was brought to Newton’s attention by Cotes in March 1713, as Cotes was beginning
to prepare his preface to E2. Newton’s response is undated, however, and it is possible that he
was already aware of the exchange, wrote his response shortly after its publication, but withheld
publication until further prompted by Cotes. I thank an anonymous referee for stressing this
point.
62Correspondence, VI 252. Leibniz’s rst letter to Clarke is also dated November 1715, and both
were sent in December. Similar criticisms are repeated mostly in the postscript to Leibniz’s fourth
letter to Clarke. I should note that the ellipsis above hides an explicit reference to Christiaan
Huygens. Leibniz cites him approvingly (likely) because he had disputed universal gravitation on
the basis of measurements of the length of the second-pendulum. This issue is distinct, however,
from that of the vacuum. See Schliesser and Smith, “Huygens’s 1688 Report.”
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“collu[sion] in the signications of words” and his malevolent misappropriation of
“experimental philosophy,” often with regard to specic theses. In general, in the
1710s Newton aimed to distinguish his philosophy from that of his competitors
by its assiduous grounding in phenomena and experience. The strategy is well
documented.63
One topic Newton sought to defend was somewhat special. The charge Leibniz
levied in the rst Conti letter—that the existence of empty space was based on “no
experience or sucient reason”—echoed Cotes’s charge that it could be proved
by neither “abstracted reasoning; [n]or be inferred from Experiments.” Unlike
many of Leibniz’s complaints, this one had rst been brought to Newton by a
close ally. It stood independently of Leibnizian presuppositions and could not
be attributed merely to bad faith. I believe this fact is underappreciated. No
doubt, the anti-Leibnizian, polemical dimension of Newton’s writings in the 1710s
is dominant. Yet among the various rhetorical and conceptual moves aimed at
winning debate, there are also genuine attempts to clarify the extent to which
Newtonian natural philosophy, by its own lights, did or did not rest on empirical
foundations. We see these in Newton’s writings on vacuum and body. If we do not
come to these assuming their only function was to silence opposition or assuming
DG as their interpretive framework, they oer conceptions of empty space, body,
and their relation to empirical evidence that are importantly dierent than DG’s
in ways that are genuinely responsive to Cotes’s 1712 insight about the centrality
of vis inertia. I’ll focus here on the proposed revisions to Book III.64
In drafts intended for E3 but never published, Newton dened what he took to
be the key concepts of Book III, The System of the World. He began with ‘body’ and
‘vacuum,’ later added ‘rule,’ ‘hypothesis,’ and ‘phenomena,’ and nally returned to
only ‘body’ and ‘vacuum.’ They were likely written in 1716, while or shortly after
Leibniz and Clarke corresponded on the question of the vacuum and its empirical
support.65 Newton had used “corpus” and “vacuum” throughout the Principia, but
63Shapiro, “Newton’s ‘Experimental Philosophy’”; Ducheyne, The Main Business, Ch. 5.
64Drafts for the 1717 Opticks are similar. There, for example, Newton asked “Can any space
be wthout something \in it/ & what is that something in space void of matter [& what are its
properties & operations on matter].” He also made clear that: “By a Vacuum I do not mean a space
void of all substances.” See Newton Project NAT00055 and Ducheyne, “Newton on Action at a
Distance,” 697. As Ducheyne rightly notes, in these drafts Newton was concerned with spatially
pervasive active principles.
65McGuire, “Body and Void,” is still the authoritative study of these denitions. Instead of
repeatedly citing it, I note here that much of what I say below has been said there, more eloquently.
The translations below are in McGuire’s §3 and are only slightly modied. Newton’s most mature
page indications, on ADD 3965 504r, show that he intended the denitions to precede the Regulae
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the rst mention of “vacuum” in the proposition sequence of Book III—the book
that “come[s] down to physics”—was in E2.3.6.c4, the corollary studied in the
previous section. This corollary was the rst point in the book at which Newton
argued for the existence of “vacuum,” and so in the draft denitions he certainly
had its interpretation in mind. All drafts champion the point with which Cotes
had launched his critique; that in the Principia body is, and should only be, dened
by its vis inertia:
Body I call every thing which can be moved and touched, in which there is
resistance to tangible things, and its resistance, if it is great enough, can be
perceived.66
Newton had already announced this conception in E1 (in Denition 3 of Book
I), but in the 1716 drafts he stressed its extreme narrowness. Newton claimed
that body is only to be understood as a thing that moves and resists. Completely
lacking is DG’s conception of body as a determined quantity of extension that
resists. It is simply as a thing that moves and impedes the motion of other things:
"[In] the third Denition [of Book I] I said that the force of inertia was
proportional to the body and was innate and essential, and that this force
is the power of resistance by which every body attempts to stay preserves
[sic] in its state of rest, or moving uniformly in a straight line. By body
I understand everything tangible, in which there is a resistance to bodies
touching it, and whose resistance, if it is great enough, can be perceived . . .
I understand body in [what follows] in no other sense than the one which I
have dened.67
Newton dened ‘body’ here through a single feature, the power to resist a change
of state, and left unaddressed whether other features are equally ‘innate and
essential.’ The narrowness was not due to lack of options. Newton was well aware
of other possible powers, such as those associated with electricity, vital processes,
and alchemistry. But, strictly speaking, ‘body’ pertained to none of them.
The denition of ‘vacuum’ is more important for us. The Cotes exchange
yielded a conditional in E2.3.6.c4: given the assumption that the fundamental
constituents of matter are equally dense, a vacuum is granted. But what is ‘the
philosophandi. I am taking them to be signicant despite the fact that they never appeared in
print because they dovetail with a good deal of Newton’s statements from the mid–1710s. If they
were actually errant, abandoned thoughts, my overall case becomes weak.
66Add 3695 422r.
67Add 3695 403r, emphasis added.
January 24, 2016 | 24 of 34
zvi.biener@uc.edu
Empty’ empty of? A reader of E2 could have easily understood Newton to assert
that, conditionally, an absolute vacuum exists. However, the narrowness of the
denition of ‘body’ forecloses this possibility. It entails that ‘the Empty’ is only
empty of one thing: the power to resist. In the previous section, we saw that
Cotes’s comment to Clarke indicates that he likely realized this, but let the matter
go. The denition of ‘vacuum’ shows that, at least by 1716, Newton had caught
up. His new denition suggests that questions about the absolute fullness or
emptiness of space are distinct from questions about the presence or absence
of the power to resist, unless by “fullness” or “emptiness” we merely mean the
presence or absence of resistance:
Vacuum [vacuum] I call every place [locum, later spatium] in which bodies
can be moved without resistance.
. . . For just as geometers dene a line that has length without breadth,
so that their propositions concerning lines of this sort are merely [solum-
modo] understood, and in mechanics, however, and other sciences the line
having breadth has a place; thus body and vacuum are here dened so that
these words may be understood in the sense dened in what follows. About
other bodies and another vacuum let authors in other sciences dispute.68
The correlative denition of ‘body’ and ‘void’ through the presence or absence of
a single power leaves open the possibility that space empty of this power may be
full of others, powers that “authors in other sciences” may dispute.
I can only scratch the surface of these denitions here.69 But their main point
should be clear. As far as the investigations of the Principia are concerned, only
entities possessed of vis inertia matter. Inferences that stretch the Principia’s
conclusions to apply to other sorts of entities are unwarranted by the evidence
made possible through the Principia’s analysis of force and motion. Of course,
the polemical understanding of Newton recommends reading “let authors in
other sciences dispute” not as seriously as I have, but as sarcasm, as Newton’s
eye-rolling dismissal of objects of natural investigation other than his ‘body’.70
There is even supporting textual evidence. For example, Newton wrote in these
drafts that:
68Add 3695 422r. The nal draft, on 504r, is virtually identical.
69In particular, there is much more to say about Newton’s claim that he is dening the physical
concepts of Book III “just as geometers dene a line that has length without breadth.” The idea
that these denitions are like geometrical denitions, but nevertheless preface the physical portion
of the Principia is taken up in Biener, “De Gravitatione Reconsidered: The Changing Role of
Geometrical Denitions in Newton’s Metaphysics of Space.”
70I thank Evan Thomas for pressing me on this.
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The Quintessence is dierent from the four elements and is subject to none
of the senses nor can it numbered among phenomena. Prime matter which
is neither a thing nor possessed of quality nor a thing that can be measured
is not a phenomenon. The subtle matter by which the heavens are lled . . .
is not a phenomenon. And things which are not phenomena, have no place
in experimental philosophy[.]71
If these are the “other sorts of bodies,” then Newton’s mention of his oft-dismissed
adversaries—the speculative Aristotelians and Cartesians—can suggest that he
believed there were no “other sciences.” If this were true, the possibility that
space may be full of powers not studied by the Principia would be an empty
possibility, one raised only to ridicule opponents. But this isn’t the whole picture.
Immediately after the above quote, Newton seems to genuinely assert that the
philosophy articulated in the Principia—his experimental philosophy—is only
the rst step in an investigative sequence that ought to involve “other sciences.”
Newton here both reiterated the limitations imposed on the Principia by his new
denitions and suggested that the goal of inquiry is to exceed them. The draft is
messy but clear:
Inductive argument taken from experiments and the observations of sensible
things on which experimental philosophy is based, cannot be applied to
hypothetical or metaphysical entities except by means of hypotheses . . .
therefore the things which are said in this book concerning bodies by the
power of induction bears no reference to entities of this sort . . . From this
philosophy to ecient and nal causes and to hypothetical philosophy men
must proceed."72
Newton was not one to mock arguments from design. In fact, the idea that exper-
imental philosophy must eventually argue to design, ‘hypothetical philosophy,’
and ‘metaphysics’ is repeated several times in the drafts.
What’s more, Newton did not think his ‘body’ was the only object of natural
investigation. Since at least the early 1700s, he conceived of matter as a “passive
principle” by which “there never could have been any Motion in the World” and
“to arm that there are no other[s] is to speak against experience.”73 A sarcastic
reading of the E3 drafts belies the fact that Newton was entirely committed to
71Add 3965 641r. The ellipsis contains the words “genus resistentia,” but the remainder of the
phrase is unclear.
72Add 3965 641r.
73Opticks, 397. Draft to Query 23 of 1706 Optice, in McGuire, “Force, Active Principles, and
Newton’s Invisible Realm,” 171.
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the extension of natural philosophy beyond the scope of mechanics, traditionally
conceived. He held that things possessed of powers other than vis inertia existed
and were open to natural philosophical investigation. Given his long-standing
belief that all existence was spatio-temporal, it seems to me that whether those
things and powers lled or did not ll space would have been a sensible question
to him, whether those things were strictly “bodies” or not. I thus nd a genuine
admission behind the sarcasm: there are more things on heaven and earth than
are dreamt of in experimental philosophy. The admission is important for un-
derstanding how Newton conceived of the relation between his metaphysics of
space and the experimental evidence regarding aetherial resistance.
6. e v i d e n c e a n d m e ta p h y s i c s , j a n i a k a n d s t e i n
Newton’s admission in the draft denitions that the Principia’s conclusions were
of limited scope implies that his evidence regarding aetherial resistance did not
support the claim that “there is no force of any kind present in space,” even assum-
ing the homogeneity assumption made in DG and E1. At best, they support the
claim that there is no resistance. The connection to DG’s metaphysics should be
clear. Since the inertness of space was the cornerstone of DG’s spatial metaphysics,
a failure to infer that there is no force of any kind in space amounts to a failure
to empirically support that metaphysics. Given that E3’s draft denitions were
written as part of Newton’s overall attempt to clarify the empirical foundation
of his philosophy, and given that they concerned the very same evidence and
very same proposition Newton had previously used to support his metaphysics, I
believe the point could not have been lost on him.
I am not suggesting that Newton abandoned his core metaphysical beliefs at
the time of E3’s draft denitions, certainly not his belief in the constitutive role of
God vis-à-vis space or his belief that space per se is causally inecacious. Newton
expressed these beliefs in ways entirely consonant with DG even in 1720.74 Rather,
74In drafts for Des Maizeuax’s 1720 publication of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, Newton
wrote: “innite space or Immensity & endless duration or Eternity, are . . . modes of existence in
all beings, & unbounded modes & consequences of the existence of a substance which is really
necessarily & substantially Omnipresent & Eternal: Which existence is neither a substance nor a
quality, but the existence of a substance with all its attributes properties & qualities, & yet is so
modied by place & duration that those modes cannot be rejected without rejecting the existence.”
Subtleties aside, the terms are quite similar to the ones he used in DG, the Classical Scholia,
the Opticks, and the General Scholium. See Koyré and Cohen, “Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke
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I am suggesting that Newton abandoned a dierent but equally central belief, one
that was essential to DG: that his metaphysical beliefs were supported by, and
partially followed from, the empirical evidence rst reported in the Resistance
Scholium and later repeated in Proposition 6.
There is an important give-and-take here. Newton’s aim in the draft denitions
was to respond to Leibniz’s charge that Newtonian theses exceeded the empirical
warrant available to them. This was a touchy matter, particularly in regard to
the emptiness of space. Newton had a remarkable body of empirical evidence
showing that the Principia’s dynamical framework—the laws of motion and their
implications—were grounded in experience,75 but, as Cotes rst emphasized, that
framework concerned a particular sort of entity, one dened by its vis inertia.
Broader conclusions were not equally grounded. E3’s draft denitions took this
point to its logical conclusion. They explicitly limited the types of entities to which
the Principia applied and claimed ignorance about all others. For this reason,
the denitions allowed for a tight connection between the Principia’s dynamical
framework and the concepts of body and void appropriate to it, and thus a tight
connection between Newton’s experimental evidence and the conclusions drawn
from it, specically about the newly-dened emptiness of space.76 Yet the cost
of establishing that tight connection was severing the connection Newton once
believed existed between the experimental evidence and his metaphysics. In other
words, in his eort to distinguish his philosophy from his opponents’s by its
grounding in phenomena, Newton ensured that his evidence no longer supported
those metaphysical claims he had once taken it to support. He severed the link,
so central in DG, between natural philosophy and metaphysics. I thus read these
denitions as Newton’s self-conscious retreat from metaphysics, an admission
that the power of experimental evidence is rather modest, at least in this case.
Let me state what is at stake in the line I have drawn from DG to the E3
revisions in a dierent way, in order to engage with two of the most inuential
interpretations of Newton. According to Andrew Janiak, there are two types of
metaphysics at play in Newton’s thought.77 First, there is an autonomous “divine
Correspondence,” 96–97 and Des Maizeaux, Recueil.
75Newton’s subtlety in constructing evidence is explored in all of William Harper’s and George
Smith’s work, but see, in particular, Harper, Isaac Newton’s Scientic Method and Smith, “Closing
the Loop: Testing Newtonian Gravity, Then and Now.”
76For more on connection, see Brading, “Newton’s Law-Constitutive Approach to Bodies: A Re-
sponse to Descartes,” Biener and Smeenk, “Cotes’ Queries: Newton’s Empiricism and Conceptions
of Matter.”
77Janiak, Newton as Philosopher , 44–45.
January 24, 2016 | 28 of 34
zvi.biener@uc.edu
metaphysics” that “represents a fundamental conception of God’s nature and
relation to the natural world that is not subject to revision; hence it might be
understood to represent a basic framework for all of Newton’s thinking about the
physical world.” Janiak includes in this divine metaphysics Newton’s metaphysics
of space, in no small measure because of space’s necessary connection to God
in DG. Second, there is a “mundane metaphysics” that “occurs within the basic
framework centered on the divine; it is subject to precisely the sorts of revision
and renement that characterize all of Newton’s other work [on . . . ] the nature of
motion, the existence of various types of forces in nature, the types of causation
involved in natural change, and so on.” Janiak’s view renes Howard Stein’s
‘empiricist’ interpretation of Newton. According to Stein, there is no element of
Newtonian metaphysics that is immune from revision.78 Experimental science
may throw doubt on any metaphysical claim and must be appealed to in order to
ground any metaphysical claim. For Stein, the idea that a claim may transcend
experimental/experiential warrant betrays Newton’s deepest commitments as a
philosopher.
The rst half of the present essay points to a problem in Janiak’s account. InDG
and E1, Newton believed that his conception of space and space’s relation to the
rest of creation—part of his ‘divine metaphysics’—was responsive to experimental
ndings in a way that falls through the cracks of the divine/mundane divide. In
those texts, Newton thought he justied his metaphysical claims about space
by means of experimental evidence about the absence of corporeal powers in
aetherial spaces. That approach would be superuous if his metaphysical beliefs
were wholly beyond revision. The approach does, however, capture what Stein
takes Newton to have done throughout his life: appeal to ndings in natural
philosophy to properly ground metaphysics. The second half of the present
essay shows that Janiak’s “divine metaphysics” captures an important element
of Newton’s later thought: as the link between Newton’s experimental evidence
and spatial metaphysics became more tenuous, he did not come to reject his
metaphysics. Rather, he came to sever its connection with the experimental
evidence; that is, to reassess its relation to natural philosophy. In short, I believe
that what Janiak portrays as the autonomy of Newton’s divine metaphysics of
space emerged in Newton’s thought in the 1710s, as he was forced to engage
vociferous opposition (at least insofar as the status of space as an aection/
emanation is concerned).79 And it emerged because he realized that his beliefs
78Stein, “Newton’s Metaphysics” and other works.
79Whether the autonomy of all elements in Newton’s divine metaphysics emerged or was
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about space could not be grounded in experimental evidence as he once thought.
Stein’s ‘empiricist’ interpretation of Newton captures Newton of DG and E1 well
(at least insofar as the grounding of the emanation thesis in empirical evidence
is concerned), and it even captures many of Newton’s later statements about
the relation of metaphysics to experimental philosophy, but it does not capture
what I have argued is a shift in the actual structure of his beliefs. Newton’s
development is a development, and spans parts of both views.80 Insofar as Stein’s
view is the ‘mundane’ subset of Janiak’s view, my point can also be put like this:
the boundary between Newton’s divine and mundane metaphysics moved in the
course of Newton’s life. The extent to which he held, at any given time, that his
metaphysical beliefs were grounded in experimental evidence depended on the
beliefs in question, the evidence available, and his interpretation of the evidence.
7. c o n c l u s i o n
I’ve argued that the signicance of experimental evidence for Newton’s meta-
physics of space changed from DG to E3’s draft denitions. In DG, Newton
thought his account of space as an aection/emanation was directly supported
by empirical evidence that there was no force of any kind in space. He said so. In
E1, he didn’t say so, but Proposition 6 and its abandoned 1690s revisions show he
still thought so. In E2, after being confronted by Cotes, Newton recognized that
his previous inferences gratuitously assumed the proportionality of vis inertia to
extension, and so changed the claim that “a vacuum is necessarily granted” to a
conditional. This already made the connection between his spatial metaphysics
and the available evidence somewhat tenuous. It is not clear to me to whether at
the time of E2 Newton was as cognizant as Cotes about the deeper limitations of
his own argument, but by the time he authored the draft denitions to E3, he cer-
tainly realized that even the conditional’s signicance was rather circumscribed.
Given the way bodies are treated in the Principia, the conditional could at best
show that space is empty of only one kind of entity—the entity dened by its
vis inertia—and still only conditionally. About other entities and their presence
in space, we must remain mum. With this, the evidentiary connection between
constant is a dierent question. My argument concerns a single, albeit key, element in that
metaphysics.
80Ducheyne, The Main Business, Ch. 5 takes the developmental view most seriously and provides
an admirable chronology of Newton’s “methodological itinerary.”
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Newton’s metaphysics of space and measurements of aetherial resistance was
completely severed. This narrative ts well with the pronounced epistemic bent
that distinguishes E3 from the Principia’s rst two editions, and may go some
way towards explaining it. It also complicates the relationship between Stein’s
empiricist and Janiak’s divine/mundane interpretations of Newton.
I believe the broadest conclusion to draw is that DG does not represent New-
ton’s understanding of the metaphysics of space simpliciter. It is an early text,
written before Newton took many of the conceptual leaps that made the Principia
so revolutionary. His own thought, as much as the thought of his contemporaries,
was profoundly changed by the work.81
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